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How Narrative Works 
 
To appreciate the importance of Shakespeare for Freedom beyond 
Shakespearean and literary studies, consider what this journal’s title 
recognizes. Narratives work; they perform multiple works. I have 
previously argued the duality of stories working both for people and on 
people; stories we never think of affect us (Frank, 2010). Narratives shape 
our human expectations for how the world works; they affect what we 
perceive about the world, and how we make sense of those perceptions. 
Stories teach us who can expect what from life, and what are the likely 
outcomes of different responses to what life throws at us. Some narrative 
works enable human flourishing, and others are destructive. 
 The core narratives of Shakespeare’s plays can be named after 
human passions: falling-in-love narratives, ambition narratives, jealousy, 
betrayal, revenge, and more. Shakespeare takes a generalized narrative 
template—young people fall in love but face some complication to their 
being together. He populates this narrative with characters—Romeo and 
Juliet—who turn the falling-in-love narrative into a specific story with a 
time and place. The process then reverses: Shakespeare’s specific stories 
are so memorable and seem so generalizable that they lend their names to 
recognizable narratives. It makes sense to speak of a “Romeo-and-Juliet 
story” as a narrative template. That narrative informs people’s 
expectations and responses for what they count as falling in love, and it 
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can shape how others respond when two people act certain ways and 
make claims about their feelings. Shakespeare not only evokes being-in-
love. In meaningful sense, Romeo and Juliet as a narrative template 
creates experiential expectations of being-in-love, or, in other plays, 
being jealous, or seeking revenge, and so on through a whole catalog of 
human experiences, including being free. 
 Stories also work by teaching people how to tell more stories, 
especially stories about their own lives. A Darwinian metaphor requires 
cautions but seems inescapable: stories evolve, with their fitness defined 
retrospectively by the spin-offs and clones they generate. Shakespeare 
himself was retelling almost all the stories in his plays, with minor but 
significant variations on his source-story (Muir, 1977). His retellings are 
then retold, making Shakespeare’s plays one of the most significant 
corpus of stories, not just in English, but globally.
1
 A few other story 
collections might claim equal reach: in the Western tradition, the Hebrew 
Bible and some New Testament parables, ancient Greek myths and 
classical tragedies, Norse myths, perhaps the stories known as the 
Thousand and One Nights (which could claim to be the most multi-
cultural corpus [Warner, 2011]), and certainly the stories collected by the 
Brothers Grimm all display considerable evolutionary fitness. Other 
corpuses of stories might be nominated, but not that many others. How 
these story collections shape everyday stories and teach people to 
experience their lives deserves to be a central concern of studies in how 
narratives work. 
 Shakespeare for Freedom describes how Shakespeare’s stories do 
the narrative work of making freedom an expectation for a full human 
life. The plays show us variations on characters seeking to be free, 
exploring multiple possibilities of freedom. Freedom means something 
different for each character, and what impedes freedom differs in each 
play. As we, either readers, theatre goers, or people retelling the tale in a 
further variation, dwell in Shakespeare’s stories, and they dwell in us, that 
narrative process works for freedom. 
 
                                                     
1
 The global reach of Shakespeare is attested in numerous books, including Fernie’s. For 
one especially readable account, see Dromgoole (2017). See also Omar and Landrigan 
(2011) on staging Shakespeare in post-Taliban Afghanistan. An eminent example of 
Shakespeare’s global effect and the contests over how to continue to tell his stories is 
Aimé Césare’s radical adaptation, A Tempest (2002). Contemporary adaptations 
proliferate, and not only in English.  
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An Archaeology of a Narrative Corpus 
 
Ewan Fernie is professor at the Shakespeare Institute of the 
University of Birmingham, located in Stratford-on-Avon, where the 
Royal Shakespeare Company has its theatres. He is the author of several 
previous books on Shakespeare and co-editor of the Shakespeare Now! 
book series that publishes shorter, experimental critical studies that seek 
to tease out new relevance in Shakespeare’s work. These books often 
begin with the author’s autobiographical connection to Shakespeare. In its 
encouragement of that autobiographically engaged voice, this series can 
be described as an on-going exploration of critical freedom.
2
 
 Shakespeare for Freedom has, on my reading, four central aspects. 
First, Fernie’s remarkably researched cultural history describes how 
Shakespeare has inspired diverse works of political freedom in different 
countries over several centuries, including the Chartist movement in mid- 
19
th
-century England, democratic reform politics in Hungary at the same 
time, and the Robbin Island Shakespeare, a copy of the collected works 
that circulated in the best-known South African political prison during 
apartheid, with passages inscribed mostly notably by Nelson Mandela. In 
the accumulation of these historical moments, we see how Shakespeare 
has been literally a force for freedom.  
 Second, Fernie offers close readings of particular plays, focusing 
on specific usages of free and freedom, and asking more generally what 
counts as being free in different plays. He begins with the Prince’s lines 
spoken after he breaks up a brawl between the Capulets and Montagues at 
the beginning of one of Shakespeare’s earliest plays, Romeo and Juliet: 
“To know our further pleasure in this case, / To old Freetown, our 
common judgment place” (1.1.99–100). Fernie describes the history of 
Freetown as a literary device and a real place: Villafranca, still existing 
outside Verona, “deriving its name from its tax-free status from 1185” (p. 
81). Freetown as metaphor resonates throughout Shakespeare’s plays, 
sometimes as an aspiration, and often as a place. In As You Like It, the 
Forest of Arden is a version of Freetown. The freedom that Rosalind finds 
there by dressing as a man exemplifies Shakespearean freedom. 
                                                     
2
 As one example, Phillippa Kelly (2011) frames her discussion of King Lear within her 
own coming-of-age and career development as a woman in Australia. Lear is understood 
through the lens of Australian politics and cultural policies.  
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Throughout the plays, many ways of being free are depicted. But modes 
of villainy also undeniably express a kind of freedom. 
 Third, Fernie devotes considerable attention to the dangers of 
freedom, as these also are depicted in the plays. The dark side of the 
cultural history is freedom gone morally amok that justifiably claims 
Shakespeare as an influence. The most notorious case is the actor John 
Wilkes Booth, assassin of Abraham Lincoln. Booth had multiple 
Shakespearean influences, but styled himself especially on the example of 
Brutus, the idealistic assassin in Julius Caesar. Fernie is especially 
insightful on how stories are dangerous. He provides sustained, generous 
and insightful discussions of Shakespeare’s critics who argued why his 
different freedoms—freedom both of the text and in the text—are 
destructive. Among these critics, Tolstoy may be most notable; he 
detested Shakespeare, for carefully argued reasons. 
 Fourth, and overall, Fernie significantly updates and extends the 
case made by Jonathan Bate’s 1998 book, which, for my interests at least, 
is the most insightful recent Shakespearean study.
3
 Bate was rescuing 
Shakespeare from what was a prevalent British political appropriation of 
his plays and his image to support conservative politics. Everyone wants 
to enlist Shakespeare to their side, and because Shakespeare’s brilliance 
lies in making all sides plausible and even admirable, his work is readily 
enlisted to multiple political positions. Fernie’s history of interpretative 
responses to Shakespeare shows different ways that literature can be 
political; how political impulses develop through personal stories, and 
how these stories then act upon persons. Shakespeare himself exemplifies 
freedom as he is repeatedly enlisted and appropriated, yet always slips out 
of the limiting effects of these enlistments, refusing one-side-or-the-other 
stances. That is his freedom, again, not only in the texts but of the texts. 
 Fernie brings these different aspects together in a wonderfully 
seamless book. Shakespeare for Freedom exemplifies sociology of 
literature: it shows how Shakespeare’s plays reappear and act differently 
on and for people in multiple historical contexts; who has read and used 
Shakespeare—how, in what conditions, to what effects. But these 
sociological interests must involve literary criticism, attending to the 
internal dynamics of how the plays effect their effects. Fernie’s stories of 
                                                     
3
 Bate’s (1998/2008) title, The Genius of Shakespeare, is not boilerplate praise; his topic 
is how the conception of genius originated as a way to describe Shakespeare. Bate writes 
a cultural history of what different centuries counted as “genius” in Shakespeare. 
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people whom Shakespeare has worked for and on create new concentric 
circles of Shakespearean characters: stage performers and producers; 
literary critics and philosophers; political reformers and assassins. 
Shakespeare for Freedom is thus an exemplary study of how one 
narrative corpus has worked, relating historical moments to textual detail. 
But what is freedom in Fernie’s understanding of Shakespeare? 
 
Narrative Freedom 
 
Fernie comes closest to defining freedom in his extended 
discussions of Hegel’s writings on Shakespeare. “Shakespeare can help us 
to understand Hegel’s portrayal of freedom as a positive and absolute 
commitment to the endless contradictions and compromises of life and 
responsibility,” Fernie writes (p. 209). Among the many contributions of 
Shakespeare for Freedom, I found Fernie’s reclaiming of Hegel’s radical 
vision to be among the most significant. But how does Shakespeare help 
us, as Fernie says, to understand Hegelian freedom? 
 Fernie’s own understanding of freedom is laid out as the book 
opens. Freedom has two sides that are complementary. One side is 
freedom for whatever it means to “be yourself” (p. 2). All of 
Shakespeare’s characters, heroes, villains, bawds, lovers, and fools 
struggle to be some version of a self that faces opposition in its 
realization. They seek to be what Hegel described as “free artists of their 
own selves” (as cited in Fernie, p. 52; subsequently quoted several times 
with elaborated interpretation). How far this ideal can be achieved is a 
major contention within Shakespearean criticism, as any social scientist 
would expect. The idea of the self as anyone’s “own” is among the most 
contested in different academic literatures.
4
  
 The necessary complement of “be yourself” is the freedom to be 
different from what you have been. “This is the freedom not of being 
(what you are) but becoming (what you might be), the freedom to cast off 
all that you have been till now in a sudden, insurgent desire to be 
otherwise” (p. 4). As Fernie says a bit later, this is freedom “from self” (p. 
5). Those thoughts lead Fernie to characterize freedom as “a specific and 
welcoming disposition toward life” (p. 5). If that lacks specificity, 
                                                     
4
 In Shakespearean studies, the crucial text provoking these controversies is Greenblatt 
(1980). I have spent my career as a sociologist asking what is the “self” in Erving 
Goffman’s (1959) classic work, which I regret Greenblatt does not engage.  
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defining freedom is not the point for either Fernie or Shakespeare. The 
need for stories—Shakespeare’s plays—is also the limit of definitions. 
 We—scholars, political activists, anybody trying to do the right 
thing—turn to stories because definitions become progressively less 
useful as any idea gets bigger, and freedom is among the biggest, up there 
with dignity, truth, and love. We turn to stories because it’s less useful to 
be told in universal and abstract language what freedom is than to be 
shown recognizable characters struggling to be free in the troublesome 
conditions of their complicated lives.  
 How stories show us lives in order to teach us how to live brings 
us to an apparent paradox about Shakespeare, about Fernie’s case for 
turning to Shakespeare to enact specific political freedoms, and about 
how narrative works. A fitting epigraph for the paradox of how stories 
represent the real is Polonius’s famous line from Hamlet: “And thus do 
we of wisdom and of reach / … By indirections find directions out” 
(2.1.65-67).
5
 In briefest terms, what is most real is often discovered by 
way of the fantastic, which is no news in some academic fields and a 
subversive provocation in others. A couple of Shakespeare’s plays are 
explicitly fairy tales (A Midsummer Night’s Dream and The Tempest) and 
most of the others depend on folkloric motifs and tropes. The paradox is 
that stories can be more truthfully representational of the real, and more 
real in their effects on those who hear them, because the plot is 
improbable. The same paradox underlies the representational reality of 
dreams claimed by Freud. 
 To be more specific on this important point, after Fernie states the 
two sides of freedom to be yourself and to be different from yourself, he 
offers as an exemplar Rosalind in As You Like It.  I will fill in more plot 
details than Fernie offers to his readers. Rosalind is the daughter of Duke 
Senior who has been deposed by his brother, an event that happens with 
some regularity in the corpus of Shakespearean stories (Lake, 2016). 
After the coup, Duke Frederick allows his niece Rosalind to remain at 
court, because of her closeness to his daughter, Celia. Then, in another 
typical Shakespearean reversal, Duke Frederick becomes suspicious of 
Rosalind and banishes her. She and Celia take off together to the Forest of 
Arden, where Duke Senior and his loyal nobles are camping in a pastoral 
                                                     
5
 As often in Shakespeare, what in context is a self-serving statement by a morally 
questionable character can be, out of that context, a useful aphorism. But the aphorism 
remains haunted by the original usage. No truths are simple. 
 
NARRATIVE WORKS 7(1)      79 
 
fantasy setting, although the women choose to live apart from Rosalind’s 
father’s camp and keep their identity secret.  
 To protect herself and Celia on the road to the Forest of Arden, 
Rosalind has adopted male dress, calling herself Ganymede, a name with 
provocative sexual ambiguities. She takes to being Ganymede, 
particularly enjoying not being recognized by her father. As Fernie notes, 
Rosalind retains male dress and identity long after any necessity requires 
it. Rosalind embraces being something different, which is Fernie’s point: 
“no one simply coincides with what she or he is” (p. 183), and later, they 
“render themselves as pictures in process, which henceforward they 
themselves will be able to reshape and change” (p. 186).  
 But as much fun as Rosalind is, do her actions deserve Fernie’s 
description as an “insurgent desire” (p. 4, quoted earlier)? Rosalind and 
Celia’s insurgency is comfortably funded by the jewels they bring to the 
Forest of Arden and use to buy a farm. Celia and Rosalind further comfort 
themselves by enlisting Touchstone, the court fool, to accompany them. 
Again, the issue is whether the story’s folkloric qualities of fantasy 
detract from holding up Rosalind as an exemplar of the freedom to be 
different from what you are. More generally, if freedom is political, as 
Fernie argues that both personal and communal freedoms are, how useful 
are Shakespeare’s folktales in real political worlds? 
 My argument, to which Fernie brings me but which is not his 
explicitly, is that Shakespeare’s stories are useful for people to live with 
as a preparation for turning to the practical difficulties of real-world 
politics of freedom. We return to the paradox of representation. What 
exactly is “real” about any world is not so simple; or, put differently, it is 
from provisionally inhabiting worlds that seem counter-factual—such as 
the Forest of Arden in As You Like It—that we humans can prepare 
ourselves to sort out what’s real in our own worlds. Preparation is the 
substantive problem of many of the plays, in which characters are well or 
badly prepared, and may or may not be given time to prepare. A comedy 
is a story in which characters are given time to prepare; literally a grace 
period. Fernie does not ask, and Shakespeare does not say, how Duke 
Senior came to be deposed. In The Tempest, it’s explicit that Prospero, 
another deposed Duke, was remiss in how he governed, and while his 
brother was ambitious, his coup also filled a gap that had been left open. 
Duke Senior needs to spend time in the Forest of Arden, leading a 
pastoral-fantasy life, to prepare to return to rule better than he ruled 
before. In Freetown places like the Forest of Arden, you learn what you 
need to be in order to return to a world that needs you to be that person.  
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 The Forest of Arden is many things, but not least it’s a metaphor 
for narrative space, the space of being caught up in a story that has all the 
fantasy elements of the most engaging stories. Rosalind and Celia’s 
fantastic adventure is all the more useful as preparation for insurgency 
because of its fantasy elements as a story, including taking along a good 
supply of jewels readily convertible into property. The issue is not 
whether the story is realistic as a depiction of freedom or whatever else. 
The issue is whether the story can prepare those who dwell in it—who 
become caught up in its world—to subsequently engage the real of their 
own worlds; that is its narrative work. Rosalind eventually puts a dress 
back on; her father will return to be a ruler. We the audience leave the 
theatre, after spending our time there. The work of the story is not to be a 
guidebook to what happens back in the real. Instead, the story works to 
change our sense of what is real, and what might be possible, back in that 
world.  
 That takes me back to what Fernie does say explicitly, writing 
about the 19
th
-century Chartist political reformer Thomas Cooper: 
“Crucially for Cooper … Shakespeare wasn’t so much a model as a 
stimulus” (p. 135). That distinction between model and stimulus says a 
great deal about what work we can expect stories to do, and what we best 
not expect them to do. Especially in medical practices, in law courts, and 
in research settings, stories are expected to report with representational 
exactness. Stories can be harnessed to do that work of being a model of 
past events, but stories find their freedom by being a stimulus to a future 
that requires reshaping the past.
6
 
 Much else could be said about what Fernie teaches us, but in this 
review for a journal that is broadly social scientific, one other point 
clarifies narrative research. “Shakespeare makes no attempt to give us an 
overarching myth,” Fernie writes. “He offers only series of plays. One 
comes to an end; another begins. There is no final, definitive synthesis” 
(p. 7). As often in Shakespeare for Freedom, much provocation is loaded 
into few words. We should not seek to abstract a theory of freedom from 
Shakespeare’s plays. What we should appreciate is the affirmation of a 
struggle that “will never be over” (p. 7).
7
 That emphasis on unfinalizable 
process can be difficult for social scientists to affirm in their research 
                                                     
6
 On my reading, the first, clearest statement of this idea is Mattingly (1998), albeit 
stated with different emphasis. I take up the discussion in Frank (2010). 
7
 Fernie does not cite Charles Taylor, but he echoes Taylor’s (1991, p. 71 ff.) reclaiming 
of the motto of the Red Brigade, “la lotta continua.” 
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practices, especially how they write. Journals and funding agencies 
reward finalized “findings” that claim generalized applicability. In the 
face of those expectations, Fernie states what I take as true: “Shakespeare 
expresses the unavoidable and unending power of contingency” (p. 7). 
 Instead of a theory, we have a “series of plays” (p. 7, quoted 
above). So-called narrative analysis should take that seriously. Each play 
is a singular, unique story; each “retains its own separate integrity” (p. 7). 
But Shakespeare’s collected plays are what I called earlier a corpus of 
stories. A corpus of stories might be literary or it might collect 
ethnographic or interview materials. Such a corpus is a distinctive kind of 
body, with each story whole in itself, but the whole of the corpus 
affecting the sense of each part. Within the series of Shakespeare’s plays, 
what can be understood about any specific character broadens and 
deepens when we consider other characters who share some variant of the 
same dilemma. To know Duke Senior, it helps to think of Prospero. 
Rosalind is complete in herself, but living with her as a stimulus is 
enhanced by thinking of Shakespeare’s other cross-dressing women of the 
road, including Viola in Twelfth Night and Imogen in Cymbeline. Just 
outside that circle is Isabella in Measure for Measure who, like Rosalind, 
undertakes a quest leading through the surreal landscape. But Isabella 
seems an inversion of Rosalind: she continues to wear her novice nun’s 
habit in which she first appears. That habit represents Isabella’s struggles 
to continue to coincide with what she first appears to be, while most of 
the play’s other characters show themselves to be otherwise than their 
first appearance. At the play’s end, Isabella’s freedom is an open 
question, and that variation enriches our sense of the problem of being 
free. What makes a collection of stories into a corpus is how plots and 
characters cross reference each other, elaborating recognizably common 
dilemmas. 
  
Narrative Knowing 
 
Fernie shows us many variations on freedom in Shakespeare’s 
plays, and variations in how Shakespeare’s plays have been taken as 
resources for projects of political freedom in life outside the theatre. For 
readers of this journal, perhaps more significant is what Fernie’s 
discussion of historical figures like Thomas Cooper teaches us about a 
narrative way of knowing. Cooper, in his aspiration to freedom, seems 
closest to being Fernie’s real-life counterpart to Rosalind. Cooper 
lyrically describes Shakespeare as offering him “‘wondrous knowledge of 
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the heart’” (as cited in Fernie, p. 129). The story of Cooper’s life shows 
that phrase is earned. He was a self-educated man from the industrial 
north of England who devoted himself to voting reform that was 
considered sufficiently radical for him to be incarcerated. Cooper was 
offered the opportunity of attending Cambridge, which he wanted almost 
as much as anything, but the cost was a promise of his future silence on 
politics. He turned down the offer. Fernie writes that Cooper “experiences 
this Shakespearean vision as more than just a sublime enhancement of his 
own ego—it opens into his vision of social freedom as such” (p. 129).  
 Fernie situates that vision of social freedom on a dual axis of 
historical breadth, in which Shakespeare’s plays act as a stimulus to 
freedom in different times and places, and textual depth, in which specific 
characters seek to be free, creating language that evokes their particular 
freedom. Fernie’s far-reaching contribution can provoke scholars from 
multiple disciplines to think differently about how narrative works 
generally, and more specifically, how narrative research can enhance the 
power of stories for freedom. 
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